Federal Grand Jury Testimony and the Fifth Amendment by Silverstein, Merle L.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 1960 Issue 3 
January 1960 
Federal Grand Jury Testimony and the Fifth Amendment 
Merle L. Silverstein 
Rosenblum & Goldenhersh 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Merle L. Silverstein, Federal Grand Jury Testimony and the Fifth Amendment, 1960 WASH. U. L. Q. 215 
(1960). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1960/iss3/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
LAW QUARTERLY
Volume 1960 June, 1960 Number 3
FEDERAL GRAND JURY TESTIMONY AND
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
MERLE L. SILVERSTEINt
The constantly increasing investigative activities of federal grand
juries have complicated the problem of the prospective witness,
whether or not he be legally and morally free from guilt. His most
effective shield is unquestionably the self-incrimination prohibition
embodied in the fifth amendment, the use and abuse of which will be
the primary concern of this article.
While widespread public attention has only recently been focused
on the privilege against self-incrimination, the concept itself is cer-
tainly not a modern innovation, but actually antedates the Bill of
Rights by more than a hundred years. In the middle seventeenth
century, the English common law first began to recognize the principle
that no man should be compelled to give testimony incriminating him-
self,, although the idea had been propounded in vain a hundred years
previously."- It was therefore a natural consequence that our founding
fathers, still painfully cognizant of the potential aggressions of a
government where individual rights were ignored, should include in
the Bill of Rights the provision that no person "shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself."'3
In recent years, however, the extensive employment of the privilege
by various individuals associated with unpopular causes, resulting in
the frustration of many important government inquiries, has encour-
aged bitter criticism of the fifth amendment from various legal and
lay sources. Nevertheless, it is safe to assume that "our old friend"4
is here to stay, and has become an integrated and essential part of our
t Partner, Rosenblum & Goldenhersh, St. Louis, Missouri.
1. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2250 (3d ed. 1940).
2. Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today 2 (1955).
3. U.S. Const. amend. V.
4. Griswold, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1.
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democratic way of life. The castigations of the critics and newspaper
editorials to the contrary notwithstanding, the proper invocation of
the self-incrimination privilege is not to be deemed inconsistent with
good citizenship. The prospective grand jury witness and his attorney
should therefore become closely familiar with the duties and obliga-
tions of such a witness, and the instances in which they may be legally
superseded by privilege. This article is concerned with increasing
such familiarization.
I. SCOPE OF INQUIRY AND COMPULSORY NATURE OF TESTIMONY
The compulsory nature of grand jury testimony cannot be contro-
verted; all duly subpoenaed witnesses must appear, be sworn, and
testify, subject only to certain privileges to be hereinafter discussed.,
The witness, furthermore, is not entitled to counsel while giving testi-
mony,8 nor is he permitted to interpose objections to the competency
or materiality of information sought to be elicited from him7
The prevalent judicial attitude seems to be to permit the grand jury
a wide and unfettered range of examination, and deny the individual
witness any standing to protest the nature or scope of his testimony,
so long as his privileges are not transgressed. A refusal by the witness
to testify, unjustified by any valid claim of privilege, can subject him
to the various contempt procedures with which the district court is
empowered. Furthermore, it should be noticed that the witness is
powerless to contest the jurisdiction of the grand jury,8 so long as he
has been properly summoned to appear before it. However, should
the grand jury exceed its jurisdiction and scope, untruthful answers
given by the witness will not constitute perjury." Thus, while an un-
lawful or excessive scope of inquiry will not justify a refusal to testify,
it will provide a perfect defense to a perjury prosecution for false
testimony. It is indeed a strange paradox in the law that while a wit-
ness escapes punishment if he falsely testifies, he is subjected to the
penalties of contempt for the more courageous action of refusing to
testify at all.
In general then, the witness before a grand jury who cannot claim
self-incrimination or other privileges has but one legal course of action
-to answer each question truthfully to the best of his ability, fore-
5. Nelson v. United States, 201 U.S. 92 (1905); Howard v. United States, 182
F.2d 908 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot, 340 U.S. 898 (1950); United States v.
McGovern, 60 F.2d 880 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 650 (1932).
6. In re Black, 47 F.2d 542 (2d Cir. 1931).
7. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1918); Nelson v. United States, supra
note 5; Howard v. United States, supra note 5.
8. Blair v. United States, supra note 7.
9. Brown v. United States, 245 F.2d 549 (8th Cir. 1957).
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going all technical and procedural objections to competency, mate-
riality or jurisdiction. Evasive answers and half-truths provide no
escape from this obligation, as they are considered as contemptuous
as lies or outright refusals. 0
IL THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
A. Scope of the PrivTege
The only ground acceptable to federal courts for a refusal by a
grand jury witness to answer certain questions is privilege, particu-
larly that against self-incrimination as established by the fifth amend-
ment of the Constitution.
The basic issue involved in this problem is whether or not the testi-
mony sought to be elicited might subject the witness to a federal
prosecution. That such testimony might involve admissions by the
witness as to guilt of crimes under state law will not invoke the privi-
lege." The case of Miller v. United States12 illustrates this point.
Here the witness was not allowed to claim the privilege, although her
testimony would have amounted to a virtual confession of prostitution
or other unlawful immoral conduct, but fell short of involving her in a
White Slave Traffic Act" violation under the federal code.
A second basic consideration, wherein the federal rule is diametri-
cally contrary to that of many states, concerns the methods of de-
termining the presence of incriminating matter in the testimony
sought. A question will not be deemed a violation of the privilege
merely because the witness claims the answer will incriminate him."-
The ultimate decision is left to the court after examination of the ques-
tion, the circumstances under which it was asked, and the position of
the witness." It is also significant to note that neither the court nor
the examiner (usually the District Attorney or his assistant) need
warn or advise the witness of his privilege, even in grand jury pro-
10. United States v. McGovern, supra note 5. One final observation should be
made regarding the grand jury subpoena. The frequent use of such a subpoena
by District Attorneys to order the witness into their office for questioning is im-
proper, and adequate grounds exist to prevent the use of statements thus ob-
tained in a prosecution against the witness. Durbin v. United States, 221 F.2d
520 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The United States Attorney's Office is no substitute for the
grand jury room, the latter being the only lawful place of appearance to which
the witness can be commanded.
11. United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
12. 95 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1938).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 2421-24 (1958).
14. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951); Mason v. United States,
244 U.S. 362 (1917).
15. Hoffman v. United States, supra note 14.
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
ceedings where he is not entitled to the representation and advice of
counsel while testifying. 6
The most difficult problem, of course, is determining just when a
question departs from the realm of propriety and tears at the mantle
of protection cast about the witness by this privilege. The classic con-
servative point of view was clearly reiterated by the United States
Supreme Court in Mason v. United States, 7 a 1917 decision arising
out of the federal territorial jurisdiction over Alaska. Gambling, out-
lawed in that territory, was the subject of investigation of the grand
jury before which defendant was called to testify. He refused, on
grounds of self-incrimination, to testify whether or not he had in-
dulged in a game of cards in a certain establishment. The Supreme
Court, in sustaining the contempt conviction, narrowly observed that
playing cards alone was not criminal, unless there were pecuniary
stakes involved. The Court then announced that invocation of the self-
incrimination privilege could be allowed only where the danger was
real and substantial, not where a witness's fear of prosecution was
remote or speculative. However, even under this stringent test, the
defendant in the Mason case seemed justified in his refusal. It is be-
lieved that the real basis of the Mason decision lies in the refusal of
the Supreme Court to reverse a decision which it felt was primarily
discretionary with the trial court. The "test" of the incriminatory
nature of a question, announced by the Court, appears to be little more
than broad general language propounded to support its decision, lan-
guage which was unfortunately seized upon by lower appellate courts
in restricting the privilege against self-incrimination.s Furthermore,
the disposition to recognize a considerable discretion in the trial judge,
as evidenced in the Mason case, has not been manifest in more recent
decisions, as will be hereafter set forth.
It will be readily observed that the most vexing problem in this type
of case occurs when the question is innocuous on its face, apparently
importing no scent of criminality. No difficulty arises when a question
bluntly and manifestly seeks incriminating information ("Did you
sell opium to John Doe?", or "Was your 1956 income understated in
this tax return?"). The Mason case represents the antiquated method
of treating the innocent type of question, vesting the trial court with
those vast discretionary powers which are peculiar to federal judicial
procedure, and setting forth a very narrow construction of the pro-
tection intended by the fifth amendment.
16. United States v. Block, 88 F.2d 618 (2d Cir. 1937); Thompson v. United
States, 10 F.2d 781 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 654 (1926).
17. Note 14 supra.
18. See, e.g., O'Connell v. United States, 40 F.2d 201 (2d Cir.); cert. dismissed,
51 Sup. Ct. 658 (1930).
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The Mason case apparently represented the unchallenged authority
on this issue until the decision of Blau v. United States,29 involving
the questioning by a federal grand jury which was investigating Com-
munistic activities in Colorado. Upon examination, defendant refused
to answer questions touching her knowledge of the officers and activi-
ties of the Denver Communist Party, on the grounds that such answers
would incriminate her. She was found in contempt, sentenced to one
year imprisonment and eventually appealed to the Supreme Court
which reversed the conviction. It was here that the Court announced
the well-known "link in the chain" rule, holding that it is immaterial
in invoking the privilege whether a specific answer requested would
support a conviction of the witness; it is only necessary that such
answers would have provided some "link in the chain of evidence
needed in a prosecution against defendant. ' 20 The Court then observed
that, in view of the Smith Act,2 defendant was clearly justified in her
refusals. The Mason case was thus effectively, if not in fact, over-
ruled, although it is still frequently cited for the broad general cliches
announced therein.
Shortly after the Blau22 decision, the Supreme Court, in Hoffman v.
United States, -2 completely reviewed the judicial interpretation of the
fifth amendment, and set forth a policy of liberality which has be-
come the guiding light in this particular field. The Hoffman case in-
volved a grand jury investigation of racketeering in New York, in
which defendant appeared as a subpoenaed witness. He refused to
answer an interrogation as to what his present employment was, and
whether he had recently seen one "William Weisberg." The district
court promptly convicted him of contempt, but was eventually over-
ruled by the United States Supreme Court, which, in reaching a de-
cision, carefully scrutinized the external extra-judicial circumstances
showing that defendant had long been known as a racketeer, had been
convicted previously on a narcotics charge, and had been characterized
in the local press as one of the type of individuals that the government
was investigating. In advocating a policy of liberal construction of the
fifth amendment, the Court expressed serious concern over the extent
to which a witness claiming the privilege should be required to justify
his refusal:
The witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he
declares that in so doing he would incriminate himself-his say-so
does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination. It is for
19. 340 U.S. 159 (1950).
20. Id. at 161.
21. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1958).
22. Blau v. United States, supra note 19.
23. 341 U.S. 479 (1950).
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the court to say whether his silence is justified, Rogers v. United
States, 1951, 340 U.S. 367, . . . , and to require him to answer if
"it clearly appears to the court that he is mistaken." Temple v.
Commonwealth, 1880, 75 Va. 892, 899. However, if the witness,
upon interposing his claim, were required to prove the hazard in
the sense in which a claim is usually required to be established in
court, he would be compelled to surrender the very protection
which the privilege is designed to guarantee. To sustain the privi-
lege, it need only be evident from the implication of the question,
in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the
question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be
dangerous because injurious disclosure could result. The trial
judge in appraising the claim "must be governed as much by his
personal perception of the peculiarities of the case as by the facts
actually in evidence." See Taft, J., in Ex parte Irvine, C.C.S.D.
Ohio, 1896, 74 F. 954, 960.24
The Hoffman case establishes the following principles in determin-
ing the self-incriminating quality of innocuous questions: (1) The
"link in the chain" of evidence rule, as first announced in the Blau 25
case, was reiterated and followed. (2) The witness's own declaration
that the question is incriminating is insufficient to invoke the privilege.
(3) The witness claiming the privilege should not be compelled to
prove the incrimination to such an extent that it would destroy his
protection. (4) The Court, in deciding applicability of the privilege,
should consider external circumstances (such as newspaper publicity,
setting, etc.) as well as the mere grammatical implications of the ques-
tion itself. (5) The privilege should be sustained on the mere possi-
bility of the disclosure being dangerous to the witness.
The Hoffman case, of course, had a resounding impact on the law
of self-incrimination. Shortly after the decision, the Supreme Court
began issuing per curiam reversals of cases in which the privilege was
denied, citing only the Hoffman case as authority.2 Contempt citations
arising out of the Kefauver Committee investigations met quick re-
versals in the courts of appeals as the full impact of the Hoffman case
was beginning to take effect. Thus, in United States v. Doto,27 the
conviction of Joe Adonis for refusal to answer was reversed on the
specific authority of the Hoffman decision by taking notice of the set-
ting in which the questions were asked- the Kefauver Committee's
wide advance publicity in investigating organized crime, and its prom-
ise to become the scourge of the underworld.28
24. Id. at 486-87.
25. Note 19 supra.
26. See, e.g., Singleton v. United States, 343 U.S. 944 (1952); Greenberg v.
United States, 343 U.S. 918 (1952).
27. 205 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1953).
28. In United States v. Costello, 198 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
874 (1952), the propriety of the privilege was more obvious. Here the Kefauver
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1960/iss3/1
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The Eighth Circuit, for example, immediately established a policy in
direct accordance with the Hoffman case principle. In Kiewel 'v.
United States,- the defendant was convicted of contempt for refusal
to testify before a grand jury, concerning the books and records of the
corporation of which he was president. The entire investigation con-
cerned the tax return of the corporation. The court of appeals, while
noting that no privilege is available to avoid embarrassment or protect
others (including one's own corporation), also observed that it would
be improper to require a witness to go into detail in explaining his
fear of incrimination, the implication alone sufficing:
When the inquiry is found to be pregnant with danger, great
latitude must be afforded the witness in determining what ques-
tion it may be dangerous for him to answer30
However, the most interesting metamorphosis of the law has oc-
curred in the Third Circuit, the one from which the Hoffnn case was
originally appealed. Immediately after the Supreme Court granted
certiorari, but before the decision of reversal was announced, the court
of appeals decided United States v. Greenberg,31 in which (consistent
with their own decision in the Hoffman case-2) they upheld the con-
tempt conviction of witness Greenberg for refusing to tell the grand
jury the business he conducted in which a particular telephone was
used. This matter was also appealed, but before the Supreme Court
had an opportunity to consider its merits, the Hoffman decision was
announced. Believing this adequately disposed of any question as to
the invalidity of Greenberg's conviction, that Court graciously re-
manded the Greenberg case for reconsideration in the Third Circuit
in the light of the newly proclaimed Hoffman rulings 33 However, the
court of appeals stood firm in its convictions. In a scholarly, well-
written opinion, Judge Maris carefully distinguished the Hofnfmn
opinion, and again upheld the contempt citation of Greenberg,"' re-
Committee had asked witness Costello what his net worth was, and to whom he
owed money. Although the court of appeals, reversing the contempt conviction,
relied essentially on the Hoffman opinion, it seems that the question here could
hardly be termed innocuous. The implication of criminality was obvious; the
admission of one's net worth provides the government with exactly one-half of
what it usually needs to prove an income tax evasion case. Hence, while the
Blau and Hoffman cases required only a "link," the Costello case involved fifty
per cent of the entire chain.
29. 204 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1953).
30. Id. at 4.
31. 187 F.2d 35 (3d Cir. 1951).
32, United States v. Hoffman, 185 F.2d 617 (3d Cir. 1950), rev'd, 341 U.S. 479
(1951).
33. Greenberg v. United States, 341 U.S. 944 (1951).
34. United States v. Greenberg, 192 F.2d 201 (3d Cir. 1951), rev'd, 343 U.S.
918 (1952),
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lying mainly on Mason v. United States,85 which had been cited with
apparent approval by the Supreme Court in the Hoffman case. Cer-
tiorari was again granted, but this time the Supreme Court was not
so kind in its treatment of the Third Circuit. In a brief, brusque per
curiam opinion, they reversed outright the decision below, citing only
the Hoffman case.36 Furthermore, a similar per curiam reversal was
adjudged at the same term in Singleton v. United States,3" which had
also been appealed from a Third Circuit decision upholding a similar
contempt conviction. Finally, that court of appeals was confronted
with United States v. Coffey, 38 in which the witness before a grand jury
had refused to testify whether certain acquaintances were engaged in
the numbers racket, and was convicted of contempt. By this time, the
Third Circuit had become well aware of the Hoffman decision, and ap-
parently realized the futility of affirming these contempt convictions
any further. Hence, the Coffey conviction was reversed by that court
of appeals, with Judge Hastie, speaking for the court, framing a
rather cynical appraisal of the Hoffman case's full import:
The decision in the Mason case would not be followed today. It
is enough (1) that the trial court be shown by argument how
conceivably a prosecutor, building on the seemingly harmless an-
swer, might proceed step by step to link the witness with some
crime against the United States, and (2) that this suggested
course and scheme of linkage not seem incredible in the circum-
stances of the particular case ...
Finally, in determining whether the witness really apprehends
danger in answering a question, the judge cannot permit himself
to be skeptical; rather must he be acutely aware that in the de-
viousness of crime and its detection, incrimination may be ap-
proached and achieved by obscure and unlikely lines of inquiry. 6
It is felt that the analysis is essentially correct, although the court's
usage of the term "incredible" was probably more the product of sar-
casm than of judicial logic. The most important observation, however,
is the recognition by the court that the Mason40 case would not be
followed today, an opinion that is apparently shared by contemporary
legal scholars in this field.4"
Within a few short years after the Hoffman decision, most federal
circuits had adopted the broad, liberal interpretation of the self-in-
crimination privilege, though with considerable reluctance in some
35. Note 14 supra.
36. Greenberg v. United States, 343 U.S. 918 (1952).
37. Note 26 supra.
38. 198 F.2d 438 (3d Cir. 1952).
39. Id. at 440-41. (Footnote omitted.)
40. Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362 (1917).
41. See, e.g., Falknor, Self-Crimination Privilege: "Links in the Chain," 5
Vand. L. Rev. 479 (1952).
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instances. Thus, the Seventh Circuit reversed a contempt conviction
in In re Portell,42 in which the defendant had refused to give testimony
concerning her previous address when the grand jury investigation
centered around an alleged close acquaintance (of questionable repu-
tation) of the witness. The court, with some hesitation, noted that it
was obliged to invoke the spirit of the Hoffman decision and uphold
the privilege whenever there is even slight possibility of the witness
giving evidence against herself.
In the Eighth Circuit, the same policy of liberality has appeared.
In Isaacs v. United States,43 the witness, as president of a corporation,
refused to give testimony regarding payments by the corporation to
certain individuals. A contempt conviction was reversed, the Hoffman
case followed, and the government's argument that the witness was
shielding others and not himself was refused by the court. It was ob-
served that it was not inconceivable that defendant could possibly be
an accessory to internal revenue violations committed by his corpora-
tion's payees, and therefore could invoke his privilege. While this is
undoubtedly consistent with Hoffman, it certainly represents a direct
retreat from the Eight Circuit's position in Saffo v. United States,44
in which this same court sustained a contempt conviction regarding a
refusal to answer questions which the court categorized as tending
to incriminate others, but not the witness Saffo. Obviously, if a wit-
ness has knowledge of incriminating facts concerning his associates,
his own criminal liability as a potential accessory would always seem
to justify a fifth amendment refusal to testify, as in the Isaacs situa-
tion.45 This possibility was ignored in the Saffo case, as was the Hoff-
man holding, with an unexplainable decision as the result. Inciden-
tally, a remarkably terse analysis of the Hoffman decision is contained
in the Isaacs case:
To warrant a denial of the privilege it must appear in the set-
ting in which the question is asked that the answer cannot possibly
have a tendency to incriminate.48
Most important, of course, is the interjection of the word "possibly,"
which expresses the real innovation of the Hoffman decision; prior to
that, "substantial" or "reasonable" chance of incrimination was the
criterion employed.
Consistent with the Isaacs holding is United States v. Trigilio,4 7
where the court upheld witness's refusal to tell about conversation
42. 245 F.2d 183 (7th Cir. 1957).
43. 256 F.2d 654 (8th Cir. 1958).
44. 213 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1954).
45. Isaacs v. United States, supra note 43.
46. Id. at 658.
47. 255 F.2d 385 (2d Cir. 1958).
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with his brother-in-law who was suspected of a bank robbery. As in
Issacs, the court here noted that an accessory prosecution was pos-
sible, and such conversations could be a link in the chain needed to
incriminate the witness. Undoubtedly, the Second Circuit was influ-
enced by the outright per curiam reversal of its previous decision in
United States v. Trock. 8 In that case, where witness refused to an-
swer questions about whether he knew various people (who were all
apparently under investigation), the court of appeals apparently
felt that the Hoffman case did not support the assertion of the privi-
lege where the questions were completely innocuous in themselves,
even though they might have developed into a chain of evidence later;
the time for asserting the privilege, held the court, was when such a
chain did begin to develop. The per curiam reversal by the Supreme
Court cited only the Hoffman opinion, without further comment.
The Ninth Circuit, too, received its fifth amendment education
from the Supreme Court in a summary manner. In three cases, 5 the
defendants were convicted of contempt for refusing to give their pres-
ent address to a congressional committee (House Un-American Activ-
ities) investigating Communism. The three convictions, affirmed in
the court of appeals, were reversed in the Supreme Court in one brief
per curiam opinion,50 citing only the Hoffman case. This particular
reversal is significant because in neither of the three cases had there
been any sort of record made in the district court to establish a setting
which might justify the witnesses' fears. Apparently, the Supreme
Court followed defense arguments that in this type of investigation,
seeking out an entire subversive movement, even one's address might
be a vital link connecting him to the party or its activities.
Other instances of the expanded scope of the self-incrimination
privilege are numerous, throughout the circuits. A scholarly r~sum6 of
case-by-case development of the present status of the law is presented
in Aiuppa v. United States,,1 where the Sixth Circuit reversed a con-
tempt conviction based on defendant's refusal to tell the Senate Crime
Committee whether he knew "R. H. O'Donnell," when R. H. O'Donnell
had already given much derogatory information to the government
concerning the witness. Again, in the investigation of the famous
Brink's robbery, contempt convictions were stricken down in the Third
Circuit, where the setting showed that the grand jury was trying to
elicit information from witnesses who were actually suspects. In such
48. 232 F.2d 839 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 351 U.S. 976 (1956).
49. Simpson v. United States, 241 F.2d 222 (9th Cir.), rev'd, 355 U.S. 7 (1957);
Wollam v. United States, 244 F.2d 212 (9th Cir.), rev'd, 355 U.S. 7 (1957); Mac-
Kenzie v. United States, 244 F.2d 712 (9th Cir.), rev'd, 355 U.S. 7 (1957).
50. Simpson v. United States, 355 U.S. 7 (1957).
51. 201 F.2d 287 (6th Cir. 1952).
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a case, it was held that the privilege could be claimed for all but the
most routine questions.12 And, the Second Circuit, still smarting from
the reversal of the Trock case,53 reversed a contempt conviction of a
union leader who refused, on grounds of self-incrimination, to give the
grand jury various answers concerning the operation of his union.",
The reluctance of the court to so hold was metaphorically illustrated
by the opening passage of the opinion by Judge Frank:
As we have several times noted previously, our function (as an
inferior court) is often to serve as a judicial moon, reflecting, as
best we can, light from the sun of our system. The latest shaft
of light from that source, in the direction of a case like this, is
Trock v. United States .... 55
Such language is significant because it illustrates the tremendous im-
pact of the Hoffman case, and its compelling effect on lower tribunals
not apparently in sympathy with the spirit of the Supreme Court in
that decision. That effect has been achieved not so much by the Hoff-
man decision itself, but more by the numerous per curiam reversals
that cite it. It has indeed become one of the strongest precedents in
our federal judicial history.
Little more can thus be said concerning the scope of the self-in-
crimination privilege. While the court still retains the power to de-
termine the applicability of the privilege (as per Hoffman), it must
indeed be an unusual situation, completely devoid of even the most
remote possibility of incriminating tendencies, when the claim of privi-
lege will be denied as to any particular question. What the future
holds in prospect on this matter is purely speculative, as this will de-
pend entirely on the personality and philosophy of the nine individuals
comprising our highest tribunal. Just as Mason v. United States"
became a useless antiquity as judicial precedent, although never over-
ruled, so may the same fate befall the Hoff'nun decision at a time
when a narrow, strict interpretation of the privilege Will be in vogue.
But for the present, the constitutional guarantees of the fifth amend-
ment enjoy the most liberal interpretation that the very language of
that provision will admit.
A particular caution should be noted at this point with respect to
so-called "blanket" refusals to testify. Even though the liberal appli-
cation of the fifth amendment could conceivably justify refusal to
answer any but the most routine questions, the courts still retain, and
52. Maffie v. United States, 209 F.2d 225 (1st Cir. 1954); Carlson v. United
States, 209 F.2d 209 (Ist Cir. 1954); Hooley v. United States, 209 F.2d 219 (1st
Cir, 1954).
53. Note 48 supra.
54. United States v. Gordon, 236 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1956).
55. Id. at 918.
56. Note 40 supra.
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jealously guard, the power to make the final determination of the
propriety of the privilege. The witness should therefore claim the
privilege as to each individual question, but never, under any circum-
stances, proclaim in advance his intention to refuse to answer all
questions on self-incrimination grounds. Such was the fatal error of
the witness in Enrichi v. United States,57 whose contempt conviction
was upheld on appeal. This is one of the very few such convictions
since the Hoffman case which has not been reversed. The lesson of
the Enrichi holding is strong and simple: "blanket" refusals, or asser-
tions of the privilege in advance of the questioning, will not be sus-
tained by the court, even though many or all of the intended questions
could have been properly answered individually by a fifth amend-
ment refusal.5 8
One further pertinent limitation on the scope of the privilege is
suggested by Knapp v. Schweitzer," which involved a New York State
grand jury investigation of labor union activities. After being granted
immunity from state prosecution, defendant still refused to testify on
fifth amendment grounds and fear of federal prosecution, and but-
tressed his claim by proof that the United States Attorney had made a
public statement that he was carefully observing and cooperating in
the state proceedings. Although recognizing that a real danger of
federal prosecution did exist, the United States Supreme Court refused
to set aside the state contempt conviction, noting that the fifth amend-
ment in no way limits state action or proceedings. While it was diffi-
cult to quarrel with the logic of this opinion, it certainly made available
a potent device to circumvent the fifth amendment, wherever local
state authorities would cooperate. However, such evidence has now
been held to be inadmissible in federal prosecutions and the "silver
platter" doctrine abolished.5"g
B. Books and Records
The application of the privilege against self-incrimination to in-
stances regarding production of books and documents has been rather
clearly defined. The basic premise in this situation is that the privilege
is a personal one, available only to an individual for his personal pro-
tection. On this theory, the Supreme Court has ruled that the produc-
tion of papers and documents of a corporation, labor union or other
57. 212 F.2d 702 (10th Cir. 1954).
58. The infirmity of the blanket refusal is that it deprives the court of the
opportunity to consider each question, and rule on the propriety of a refusal to
answer some on the grounds of the privilege.
59. 357 U.S. 371 (1958).
59a. Elkins v. United States, 80 Sup. Ct. 1437 (1960); Rios v. United States,
80 Sup. Ct. 1431 (1960).
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such association cannot be refused on fifth amendment grounds.6 0
Even though the individual who is served with the subpoena duces
tecum fears personal incrimination, he cannot refuse to produce, since
the books and records do not belong to him and are in his custody
only because of his representative capacity as an officer of the organi-
zation. The decision in United States v. White-' is one of the rare
Supreme Court holdings in the field of self-incrimination which was
handed down without dissent, and is regarded as such compelling
authority that few (if any) witnesses or defendants have ever
bothered to raise the particular issue in recent years.
Papers and documents which are subject to the privilege, however,
and which the witness may refuse to produce, include those which
are his private property, or which he possesses in a personal rather
than a representative capacity.12
Moreover, this exception to the self-incrimination privilege has been
extended to include not only books and records held in a representative
capacity, but also all papers and records (even possessed in a private
and personal capacity) which the law requires to be maintained as the
appropriate part of some government regulation.1 For example, in
Shapiro v. United States,"' defendant was compelled to produce his
personal records of sales invoices, ledgers, inventory sheets and sales
contracts which he was required to maintain under the Emergency
Price Control Act.6 5 The court of appeals ruling, affirmed by the
Supreme Court, noted that no self-incrimination privilege could be
asserted here, since these records required to be kept by law were, in
effect, public documents to which no personal privilege attaches.
But even though production of records may be mandatory, the
Supreme Court has also declared that the individual custodian never-
theless can refuse, on self-incrimination grounds, to answer any ques-
tion relative thereto. In Curcio v. United States,0 defendant Curcio,
as secretary-treasurer of a local union, was ordered by subpoena to
produce the books and records. He failed to produce them, and testified
that they were not in his possession. When the grand jury asked about
the location of the records, defendant invoked his privilege against
self-incrimination. His contempt conviction for this refusal was even-
tually reversed by the Supreme Court in a unanimous opinion declar-
ing that while the custodian of corporate or association books has no
60. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948); Wilson v. United States, 221
U.S. 361 (1911).
64. Note 63 supra.
65. Ch. 26, § 202(g), 56 Stat. 30 (1942).
66. 354 U.S. 118 (1957).
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privilege to refuse to produce them, such person nevertheless retains
his full constitutional privilege as to oral testimony pertaining to the
books. Squarely rejected was the government's contention that the
United States v. White holding,67 which negated any privilege with
respect to the records themselves, likewise ruled out any privilege
regarding questions seeking to ascertain the location of such records:
In other words, when the custodian fails to produce the books, he
must, according to the Government, explain or account under
oath for their nonproduction, even though to do so may tend to
incriminate him.
The Fifth Amendment suggests no such exception . .. A cus-
todian, by assuming the duties of his office, undertakes the obliga-
tion to produce the books of which he is custodian in response
to a rightful exercise of the State's visitorial powers. But he can-
not lawfully be compelled, in the absence of a grant of adequate
immunity from prosecution, to condemn himself by his own oral
testimony.6s
The Cureio decision thus casts important light on the requirements
of United States v. White, so that the only activity not subject to the
fifth amendment protection is the bare production of the subpoenaed
records. Even the most routine inquiry, such as "Mr. Jones, are these
the records specified in the subpoena?" might under certain circum-
stances, be refused on grounds of the privilege.(9 The same United
States v. Hoffman tests would apply as in any other oral examination,
and the mere fact that the inquiry concerns non-privileged records
does not, in any respect, diminish the protection of the Constitution.
C. Waiver of Privilege Against Self-incrimination
The self-incrimination privilege, however, may be of no avail to the
witness unless he asserts it immediately upon being asked the trans-
gressive question. A failure to claim the privilege instantly can result
in a waiver, the witness thereafter being compelled to answer any and
all interrogation on the particular subject.
Preliminary to a discussion of the principle of waiver, the im-
portance of the application of that doctrine should be pointed up by a
consideration of the plight confronting a wituess before the grand
jury. He is present, of course, without counsel, and frequently with-
out definite knowledge of the subject of investigation. Furthermore,
neither the government (nor the trial judge, if interrogation is in the
67. Note 60 supra.
68. Curcio v. United Sates, supra note 66, at 123-24.
69. Of course, as the Curcio opinion observes, there is nothing to prevent the
grand jury from utilizing other, independent evidence to show that the subpoena
duces tecum had not been fully complied with and hence the custodian is in
contempt.
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court) nor any of the examiners need warn or advise the witness of the
privilege against self-incrimination and the possibilities of waiver
thereof.T Thus the broad liberal interpretation of the self-incrimina-
tion doctrine wil be for naught if the witness is not thoroughly in-
formed as to the proper means of invoking the privilege to his benefit,
The present federal policy as to waiver was established by two land-
mark decisions, Rogers v. United States,7 and United States v. St.
Pierre.7z The St. Pierre case, earlier of the two, involved a witness
who, before the grand jury, admitted all the elements of the crime of
embezzlement, yet refused to name the victim. His contention was that
although he had virtually confessed the crime, the additional infor-
mation sought would provide the government with the necessary wit-
ness to corroborate the confession and procure a conviction. The court
of appeals, however, held that the privilege against self-incrimination
had been completely waived. Having confessed the crime, the witness
may not withhold the details.
The Supreme Court then fully supported the St. Pierre theory in
Rogers v. United States, involving the grand jury examination of
defendant in regard to her Communistic affiliation. Witness Rogers
had voluntarily testified that she was Treasurer of the Communist
Party of Denver, and previously had possession of the membership
lists and dues cards. However, she refused to disclose the name of the
person to whom she delivered these records, relying, among other
things, on the self-incrimination privilege. The Supreme Court, in
upholding her contempt conviction, observed that the witness had
already implicated herself completely under the Smith Act' and could
not incriminate herself further by answering the additional query.
The Court then cited, with approval, the St. Pierre and numerous
other federal cases holding generally that where incriminating facts
have been voluntarily revealed, the privilege cannot be invoked to
avoid disclosure of the details. Wigmore's treatise on evidence was
quoted as an approved summary of the law on this issue:
The case of the ordinary witness can hardly present any doubt.
He may waive his privilege; this is conceded. He waives it by
exercising his option of answering; this is conceded. Thus the
only inquiry can be whether, by answering as to fact X, he waived
it for fact Y. If the two are related facts, parts of a whole fact
forming a single relevant topic, then his waiver as to a part is a
waiver as to the remaining parts; because the privilege exists for
the sake of the criminating fact as a whole.74
70. United States v. Block, 88 F.Zd 618 (24 Cir. 1937); Thompson v. United
States, 10 F.2d 781 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 654 (1926).
71, 340 U.S. 367 (1951).
72. 132 F.2d 837 (2d Cir 1942).
78. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1958).
74. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2276 (8d ed. 1940).
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However, bitter dissent in the Rogers case was registered by Justice
Black, with Justices Frankfurter and Douglas concurring.75 After
making the preliminary observation that the doctrine of waiver was
but an effective device for "whittling away the protection afforded by
the privilege,'"r the dissent expresses great concern over the dilemma
created for witnesses by the majority opinion:
On the one hand, they risk imprisonment for contempt by
asserting the privilege prematurely; on the other, they might lose
the privilege if they answer a single question. The Court's view
makes the protection depend on timing so refined that lawyers,
let alone laymen, will have difficulty in knowing when to claim it.71
In view of this strong dissent by these men who constitute one-third
of our Supreme Court today, it is suggested that the law as to waiver
is far from crystallized, and future cases directly involving this issue
will probably experience little difficulty in reaching the highest
tribunal.
Consistent with the Rogers and St. PierreT holdings, but reaching
an opposite result, are Arndstein v. McCarthy", and McCarthy 0.
Arndstein.80 These cases, arising out of the same transaction, concern
the refusal of defendant to answer questions propounded by a special
commissioner of the bankruptcy court pertaining to his assets. The
district judge admitted that answers to many of these interrogations
might have incriminated Arndstein of concealment of assets, but felt
that the privilege had been waived when defendant voluntarily filed a
schedule of assets, which by implication was an assertion that he had
no other assets. Upon application for a writ of habeas corpus, the
Supreme Court reversed the ruling and ordered defendant released
from the confinement he was serving as punishment for contempt.
(The second appeal arose as a result of the marshal's return contest-
ing the writ issued by the district court.) Specifically, the Court held
that no waiver was established, the bankruptcy schedules themselves
being non-incriminating, and the general rule being, "that where the
previous disclosure by an ordinary witness is not an actual admission
of guilt or incriminating facts, he is not deprived of the privilege of
75. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 375 (1951) (dissenting opinion).
This made the decision a narrow 5-3, since Justice Clark took no part in the
proceedings.
76. Id. at 376.
77. Id. at 378. (Footnote omitted.)
78. Rogers v. United States, supra note 71; United States v. St. Pierre, supra
note 72.
79. 254 U.S. 71 (1920)
80. 262 U.S. 355 (1923).
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stopping short in his testimony whenever it may fairly tend to in-
criminate him."',
Thus, we have an obvious departure from the doctrine established
by the passage from Wigmore followed in the Rogers case. While
Wigmore claims that disclosure of one of several facts constituting a
single transaction will operate as a waiver as to all of the facts, the
McCarthy cases' 2 hold that disclosure of facts which are not incrimi-
nating does not constitute a waiver of privilege against disclosure of
other facts of the same transaction which are incriminating. Further-
more, the McCarthy cases, old as they are, still represent the existing
law on this point, being cited with approval even by the Rogers case.
The factual distinctions between the McCarthy and Rogers cases
make them consistent holdings. While witness Rogers testified to
definitely incriminating facts before deciding to claim the privilege,
witness Arndstein's testimony prior to his privilege claim concerned
non-incriminating matter. The test, therefore, is not whether there
has been testimony as to some facts involved in a single transaction
with others, as Wigmore suggests. Rather, the criterion is whether
the previous testimony, concerning the one general transaction, was
of an incriminating nature.
An excellent example of the application of the McCarthy and Rogers
rules, with a specific rejection of Wigmore's test, is the opinion in
Powell v. United States.8 3 The contempt citation of witness Powell
was based on his refusal to answer questions concerning certain
diaries he allegedly compiled. Since he had earlier testified (without
invoking any privilege) that he did not keep any diaries, the govern-
ment contended that he had waived any privilege as to the diary
matter, relying on the Rogers4 decision. This argument, however, was
repudiated by the court, which held that the Rogers case was not in
point: "If he had said that he had the diaries and then refused to
testify further about them, the privilege might not lie; this might be
the Rogers doctrine."8 5 However, since his earlier testimony denied
knowledge of diaries," no waiver was effected. This simple distinction
by the District of Columbia appellate court is a perfect expression of
the waiver doctrine as it exists today-incriminating admissions, but
not innocent denials or other innocuous answers, are necessary to
constitute a waiver.
81. Id. at 359.
82. Notes 79 and 80 supra.
83. 226 F.2d 269 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
84. Note 71 supra.
85. Note 83 supra, at 276.
86. Apparently the diaries themselves were intrinsically incriminating, so that
the court felt that a mere admission by defendant that he kept such diaries might
be an "incriminating" fact.
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Another aspect of the waiver situation was presented in Emspac v.
United States,7 wherein defendant had refused before a congressional
committee to answer many questions based on "primarily the first
amendment, supplemented by the fifth."' 8 The witness was then asked
"Is it your feeling that to reveal your knowledge... would subject you
to criminal prosecution?"8' 9 to which he gave a negative reply. In sup-
porting the contempt conviction, the government eagerly urged the
waiver doctrine, but to no avail. The Supreme Court (demonstrating
a more liberal attitude than in the Rogers case) held that defendant's
"no" reply to the question was insufficient to waive the previous defi-
nite claim of privilege. Fear of criminal prosecution, Chief Justice
Warren observed, is not the only ground upon which the privilege
may be asserted, since it also applies to matters which only tend to
incriminate or provide some link in an incriminating chain. Thus,
when a witness states he does not fear criminal prosecution as a result
of his answers, he is not necessarily abandoning his grounds for fifth
amendment refusals. The real significance of the Emspak decision,
however, lies in the apparent change of attitude of the Court on
waiver issues; the dissenters in the Rogers case, bolstered by recently
appointed justices of a liberal inclination, became the majority in the
Emspak case. One might expect that, with the present complexion of
the court, a United States v. Rogers situation might well result in a
holding exactly opposite to that in 1950 if the Emspak spirit prevails20
The importance of a prompt immediate reference to the privilege,
when answers are refused, cannot be overemphasized. While generally
courts will not require any specific technical language to invoke the
constitutional rights,," still it must appear from the record that the
witness intended to rely on the self-incrimination privilege. At any
rate, an unnecessary or unreasonable delay in declaring the reason
for refusal may well waive the privilege. In Brody V. United States,8
defendant was ordered by the district court to submit to an internal
revenue examination, and only after numerous delays, citations, and a
show cause order, the self-incrimination privilege was asserted. A
87. 349 U.S. 190 (1955).
88. Id. at 193.
89. Id. at 195.
90. Emspak v. United States, supra note 87. Yet this same court adopted a
conservative viewpoint on waiver recently, and affirmed a contempt conviction in
Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958), on grounds of waiver of privilege.
The facts of this case are not germane to the present discussion, but the attitude
of the court on the waiver problem is less liberal than in Emspak, and continues
the uncertainty in this field. (Warren, Black, Douglas, and Brennan dissented,
consistent with their prior views.)
91. Emspak v. United States, supra note 87, at 194.
92. 243 F.2d 378 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957).
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complete waiver, occasioned by the long delay in asserting the privi-
lege, was held to exist, and a contempt citation affirmed. Unquestion-
ably a prompt claim of privilege in the Brody case would have been
sustained, which only amplifies the necessity for familiarity with the
waiver doctrine in this field.
The nature of the proceedings in which a waiver may be established
has also been the subject of considerable litigation. While there have
been isolated decisions to the contrary,93 the present clear authority
holds that a waiver in some trial or proceeding will not carry over
into any other proceeding, nor is the witness, once having waived his
privilege, estopped from asserting that privilege in a new and inde-
pendent proceeding9 This applies even though the testinfony had
been given in a previous trial or grand jury session involving exactly
the same matter; the waiver, to be effective, must be established in the
identical proceeding in which the witness now claims the privilege.,"
Likewise, responding to interrogations and making admissions to
the F.B.I. agents, incriminating and damaging as those statements
may be, will not prevent the witness from asserting his privilege on
the same subject matter before a grand jury or in the district court.96
In United States v. Miranti1 this doctrine was extended even further to
refute a novel government argument. The witness Miranti had testi-
fied before a grand jury, without claim of privilege, and was there-
after indicted, convicted and sentenced. A year later, Miranti was
called before the same grand jury and again questioned about the same
activities, apparently in an effort to indict his cohorts. This time the
witness balked, and asserted his self-incrimination privilege. Among
other things, the government contended a waiver had been created;
conceding the full import of In re Neff, 9 the prosecution nevertheless
urged that here the witness was testifying (a year later) in the very
same proceeding in which he had previously waived the privilege. But
the Second Circuit was unconvinced, and, relying on the substance
93. Nicola v. United States, 72 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 1934). Here the defendant
voluntarily gave papers and.information to the internal revenue agents, which
the court found to be a waiver at a subsequent trail. While the facts do not in-
volve a situation of testimony (only personal papers), the language of the opin-
ion clearly conflicts with later and more authoritative decisions.
94. United States v. Miranti, 253 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1958); Ballantyne v.
United States, 237 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1956); In re Neff, 206 F.2d 149 (3d Cir.
1953).
95. In re Neff, supra note 94.
96. United States v. Miranti, supra note 94; Ballantyne v. United States, supra
note 94.
97. Note 94 supra.
98. Ibid.
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rather than form, held that the lapse of a year during which the wit-
ness had been indicted and convicted was a circumstance which
destroyed the "sameness" of the proceeding, at least as far as Miranti's
waiver was concerned. This opinion, it seems, recognizes the true logic
and justice in the Neff rule: a witness who once foregoes his privilege
should not be bound forever by the waiver, since the lapse of time or
intervening circumstances may give him good cause to change his
mind. Indeed, his fears of incrimination or prosecution may well have
increased, so that he no longer chooses to bear witness against himself.
One cannot help but speculate as to the influence, if any, which the
liberalized interpretations of Hoffman v. United States", might have
on the invocation of a waiver-does the enlarged scope of the self-
incrimination privilege simultaneously extend the possibilities of a
waiver? If a witness answers an apparently innocuous question
which, under the circumstances and setting, he could have refused, has
he waived his privilege of self-incrimination as to the whole trans-
action? At present, the rule is simply that an incriminating type of
answer is required to establish a waiver, yet it seems only a matter
of time before some clever government attorney will urge that an
answer which tends to incriminate (such as a link in the chain) should
likewise waive the privilege since such an answer could properly have
been refused. This will immediately be recognized as a reversion to
the Wigmore theory approved in Rogers v. United States,"" which
advocates a waiver as to any transaction once the witness has testified
as to any fact in that transaction-a theory thus far repudiated by
the courts. °1OIThe present state of the law, then, countenances a definite hiatus in
the concurrent rules concerning the self-incrimination privilege and
waiver thereof. While the privilege itself extends to matters which
even remotely may tend to incriminate, the waiver of such privilege
can occur only when an incriminating fact itself is disclosed..1 0 2 Pos-
sibly the logic of this inconsistency might be challenged; but certainly,
in view of the position of the grand jury witness who must act without
counsel in making fast decisions, any narrow limitation on the waiver
doctrine is inconsistent with our spirit of justice and fair play.
99. 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
100. 340 U.S. 367 (1951).
101. Powell v. United States, supra note 83; McCarthy v. Arndstein, supra
note 80.
102. No attempt will be made to define the term "incriminating fact." Some-
where in that gray area between manifestly innocuous answers which might
possibly tend to incriminate, and those definite admissions which confess a
crime, lies the "incriminating fact" category which will satisfy the waiver re-
quirements.
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). Legislathie Immunity
Congress has, by specific legislation, eliminated some applications
)f the fifth amendment by granting immunity from prosecution to
vitnesses testifying in proceedings (including grand jury) relating
.o certain subject matters (i.e., matters involving Interstate Com-
nerce Act, Sherman Anti-Trust Act).'o3 The scope and effect of these
statutes present some novel and unusual issues, which shall not be
zonsidered herein. For the present, suffice it to say that the grand
jury witness who might even consider invocation of his self-incrimi-
nation privilege should first ascertain that the inquiry is not one
zovered by an immunity statute which would displace the privilege. 0
Should there be any doubt, the privilege may still be asserted until it
is made clear (probably by a district court ruling rejecting the claim
of privilege) that legislative immunity is conferred in the particular
instance.
III. CONSEQUENCES OF IMPROPER REFUSAL-CONTEMPT
The principal weapon used to enforce obedience to grand jury
orders, and to prevent improper refusals by witnesses, is the contempt
procedure in the district court. The grand jury itself, of course, is
powerless to adjudge contempt, and must refer all matters of irregu-
larity to the district court, which is the only forum (in grand jury
matters) having jurisdiction to try and adjudicate contempt pro-
ceedings.
The proper procedures and interpretation of the Federal Rules were
carefully expounded by Chief Judge Magruder in Carlson v. United
States. 15 When the witness refuses to answer the grand jury's ques-
tions, he is guilty of no contempt. The matter must then be referred
to the district court for a ruling on the witness's objections or reasons
for refusal, at which time the witness or his counsel may present any
evidence or legal authority to support their position. Of course, if the
objections are sustained, the matter is ended; but if the court rules
that the refusals are not justified, the witness will be ordered to return
to the grand jury room and answer the indicated interrogations. On
his return, if the witness again refuses to answer in direct disobedience
of the court's order, he has for the first time committed a contempt.
Further proceedings will vary, depending on whether a civil or crim-
inal contempt action is pursued. No attempt will be made herein to
103. For typical immunity provisions, see Interstate Commerce Act ch. 83, 27
Stat. 443 (1893), 49 U.S.C. § 46 (1958); Sherman Anti-Trust Act ch. 755, 32
Stat. 904 (1903), 15 U.S.C. § 32 (1958).
104. See Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41 (1959).
105. 209 F.2d 209 (lst Cir. 1954).
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distinguish these proceedings; the primary and most notable difference
is simply that a civil contempt action can result in summary confine-
ment of the witness only until he agrees to abide by the court's order
or until the grand jury's term expires, whereas a criminal contempt
conviction is the basis for a specific sentence, either confinement (for a
definite period) or a fine or both.
These explanations of procedure in the Carlson case were specifi-
cally reviewed and approved recently by the Supreme Court in Brown
v. United States,"'° but an important alternative method was likewise
sanctioned in the close 5-4 decision. Here the defendant Brown, a
grand jury witness, declined to answer certain questions on fifth
amendment grounds. After a hearing, the district court overruled
the claim of privilege (a federal immunity statute was involved) and
ordered the witness to answer. Before the grand jury again, the wit-
ness violated the court's order by persisting in his refusal. However,
instead of instituting contempt proceedings, the government had the
witness again brought before the court; on this occasion, the district
judge, in the presence of the grand jury, addressed each of the con-
troversial questions to the witness, and ordered him to answer, but
again the witness refused and claimed his privilege. The court then
summarily held the witness guilty of criminal contempt, and imposed a
most substantial sentence (15 months).
The procedural error urged on appeal was that defendant should
have been prosecuted for contempt under Rule 42 (b),107 which pro-
vides for notice to defendant and a full hearing. Instead, the district
court proceeded under Rule 42(a) ,1s which authorizes a summary
punishment for contempt, without notice or hearing, in instances
where the contemptuous conduct was in the. actual presence of the
court. However, the five-man majority of the Supreme Court approved
the proceeding below, noting that the district court judge had every
right to put the questions directly to defendant to give him an oppor-
tunity to purge himself of the contempt he had already committed in
the grand jury room. When defendant again refused, he had directly
disobeyed a lawful court order in the presence and hearing of the
court, and could therefor be summarily convicted under 42 (a) with-
out a hearing or notice.
A most emphatic dissenting opinion,"°' concurred in by Justices
Black, Douglas and Brennan, was expressed by Chief Justice Warren.
These dissenters objected to the obvious action of the government
and district court to convert a clear 42(b) type of contempt into a
106. Note 104 supra.
107. Fed. R. Crin. P. 42(b).
108. Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(a).
109. Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 58 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
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42 (a) situation with summary punishment-once the contempt was
committed in the grand jury room, it should have been prosecuted as
such, with a proper notice and hearing as required by law. Further-
more, observed the dissent, Rule 42 (a) was intended to apply to
"dexceptional circumstances," and not as a vehicle to "ease the difficul-
ties of prosecuting contempts" by forcing persons already guilty of
outside contempts to repeat their actions before the court:
Given the purpose of Rule 42 (a) with its admittedly precipi-
tous character and extremely harsh consequences, this Court
should not countenance a procedure whereby a contempt already
completed out of the court's presence may be reproduced in a
command performance before the Court to justify summary
disposition."'
It appears that the basic argument between the majority and dissent
hinges on the intent of the district court: the majority interprets the
"command performance" as merely a generous act of the court in af-
fording defendant yet another chance to purge himself of contempt-
a locus penitentiae-while the dissent more cynically appraises the
procedure as a subterfuge to invoke summary punishment.
At any rate, the Brown decision does flash a most important warn-
ing to the grand jury witness. Doubtlessly, the novel procedure em-
ployed there will be imitated throughout the country since it has the
Supreme Court blessing, and provides a neat detour around the due
process requirements of Rule 42(b).
The fifth amendment witness can thus anticipate the following
step-by-step procedure when he refuses a grand jury question: (1)
His first refusal before the grand jury is not contempt, and cannot
be punished. (The privilege may thus be freely claimed in all doubt-
ful situations, without fear of punishment.) (2) A hearing before
the district court will follow, if the government wishes to challenge
the claim of privilege. At this hearing, evidence of setting, back-
ground and circumstances should be presented, if necessary, to justify
the privilege. (3) The court will rule on the refusal, and, if the privi-
lege claim is found improper, the witness will be ordered to return to
the grand jury room and answer the specified questions. (4) Dis-
obedience of the court order by again refusing to answer the specified
questions before the grand jury, will constitute contempt. (5) If a
civil contempt citation is issued, the witness, without notice or hearing,
may be summarily jailed until such time as he agrees to obey the court
order by answering. He may not be kept imprisoned beyond the term
of the grand jury. (6) If a criminal contempt conviction is sought, a
notice and hearing under Rule 42(b) will be provided. (7) A sum-
110. Id. at 54.
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mary criminal contempt conviction might be obtained if the Browno"
procedure is followed and Rule 42 (a) invoked.
Finally, it should be noted that no limit is placed on possible punish-
ments for criminal contempt,"12 so that any fine or sentence might be
imposed, subject only to the review of appellate courts as to an abuse
of discretion.
One limitation, however, which is placed on the district court in this
matter concerns the multi-question refusal. In Yates v. United
States,"' it was held that but one criminal contempt is committed
when a witness refuses to answer a series of questions in the same
general area of inquiry-the government cannot seek a multiplication
of convictions by continued questioning once the witness has indicated
his refusal to testify on that subject matter. To hold otherwise, noted
the Court, would be to reward the most contemptuous type of witness
who does not even appear to testify (but subject to only one contempt
action) and discourage the partially cooperative -witness who refuses
to answer only certain classes of questions.
CONCLUSION
One final caveat should be noted regarding the subject matter which
has been discussed herein. The law in this field is, at present, ex-
tremely dynamic and subject to changes and modifications almost
constantly, particularly in regard to the self-incrimination privilege.
Some of the cases cited will probably have been distinguished, limited
or explained during the publication processes of this review. The
practitioner with a problem in this area must therefore constantly
renew his research on a month to month basis, so that no innovation
in the law is overlooked.
111. Note 104 supra.
112. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958).
113. 355 U.S. 66 (1957).
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